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Abstract. Using a unique !rm-provincial level panel dataset "om 2005 to 2011, this study for the !rst 
time investigates the role played by corruption and provincial institutions in determining a company’s 
capital structure in Vietnam’s legal environment. Contrasting to the majority of previous studies, the 
results show that corruption has an insigni!cant in#uence on a company’s bank loans, consistent with 
institutional theory. However, the role of corruption is di$erent for types of various capital structures 
a%er controlling for both unobservable characteristics and endogeneity problems. More speci!cally, 
corruption has signi!cantly positive in#uence on short-term capital structure, but a negative impact on 
long-term loans. All of these results hold a%er a series of robust tests.
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1. Introduction
!eoretically, corruption has been considered as a crucial factor in constructing a state’s 
legal system, resource distribution and "rms’ behavior (Fan, Titman, & Twite, 2012). 
Corruption a#ects a company’s capital structure decision in di#erent ways. On the one 
hand, corruption can lead to a decrease in bank credit. When investors intend to invest 
in a company, they expect to regain their capital based on criteria speci"ed in the con-
tract (Bolton & Dewatripont, 2005; Leland & Pyle, 1977). However, investors su#er a 
higher risk in seriously corrupt countries and in the condition of the loose legal envi-
ronment. !ese higher risks and potential implementation costs make banks reluctant 
to o#er credits or increase the credit standard in a manner that will increase the cost of 
securing external funding banks (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).  In other 
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words, banks are not motived to grant more loans or o#er more credits to "rms, or even 
upgrade the credit standards in the context of higher corruption.
By way of contrast, other perspectives (e.g., Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) show that there 
is a positive linkage between corruption and capital structure. Adverse selection caused 
by asymmetric prior information between bank and debtors can lead to credit ration-
ing. !e existence of credit rationing suggests that some debtors choose to pay an in-
terest rate far in excess of the o%cial rate. Consequently, they are motivated to bribe 
bank o%cers to obtain credit. When debtors actively bribe bank o%cers to increase 
their chances of receiving credit, the corruption increases the company’s bank credit. 
In another approach, the role of "rms’ corruption behavior on the performance 
and capital structure is explained by institutional theory. !is is considered as one of 
the most popular perspectives in transitional economies (e.g., Hoskisson, Eden, Lau 
& Wright, 2000; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005). !is approach shows 
that paying bribe is simply an entry cost of "rms to join an established game and hence 
it may not a#ect the e%ciency and "rm capital structure (North, 1990).  !e story can 
go as follows: When "rms pay informal costs, this puts the pressure on neighbouring 
"rms to follow their behaviours. As a result, corruption may have li$le impact on their 
performance.
In the light of above theoretical perspectives, many empirical studies have been 
conducted from various countries, but the "ndings are inconclusive, making it hard to 
make generalized inferences. For example, Welch (2011) takes advantage of the data 
from banks and regional corruption indexes, "nding that Russia’s corruption resulted in 
blocked bank credit. Similarly, De Carvalho (2008) used corporate data on Brazil and 
found that corruption prevents corporations from obtaining bank credit. On the other 
hand, Chen, Liu, and Su (2013) indicate that corruption contributes to companies’ 
receipt of bank credit. Similarly, Fungáčová, Kochanova and Weill (2015) analysed data 
from 14 transition countries. !eir common "nding is that there is a positive correla-
tion between corruption level and a company’s receipt of bank credit. 
Compared with previous studies on capital structure, this study has several di#er-
ences. Firstly, this study examines not only "rm-level corruption but also the e#ects of 
quality of provincial institution on capital structure. Secondly, most studies focus on 
the analysis in the US and other developed countries. !ere is less empirical evidence 
on capital structure in developing countries, especially for transitional nations. !is 
question is conducted by studying the context of Vietnam because there is no empiri-
cal evidence of the impact of bribe on "rm capital structure in Vietnam. Also, despite 
implementation of the anti-corruption and anti-waste laws and various anti-corruption 
campaigns, bribes to public o%cials remain a major challenge for business environment 
in Vietnam. Furthermore, this study considers not only the e#ects of corruption on 
capital structure but also on types of capital structure. Finally, in terms of methodol-
ogy, several empirical challenges arise when considering the linkage between corrup-
tion and "rm capital structure. Unobservable characteristics and the endogeneity of ex-
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planatory variables are the main concerns; more importantly, the presence of potential 
dynamic endogeneity that can be understood as the past "rms’ leverage a#ecting the 
current "rms’ leverage. Following Wintoki et al. (2012), I overcome these problems by 
using the two-step system dynamic panel GMM models.
Interestingly, contrary to the many "ndings of previous studies, I "nd that corrup-
tion does not a#ect "rms’ capital structure a<er controlling for heterogeneity, simulta-
neity and dynamic endogeneity. !is "nding supports the viewpoints of institutional 
theory and re=ects the fact that corruption is widespread in Vietnam. Accordingly, en-
gagement in corruption is considered as an entry fee and not related with "rms’ capi-
tal structure. However, paying bribe has negative impacts on "rms’ short-term capital 
structure and positive linkages with long-term "rms’ capital structure. 
!e rest of this paper is structured as follows. !e next section presents the back-
ground of the study. Data and methodology are presented in Section 3, and Section 
4 displays empirical results. !e last section contains conclusion and the summary of 
"ndings.
2. e background of the study
Table 1 provides the overall situation of capital supply in Vietnam. Despite the fast 
development of Vietnam’s capital market, banks remain the major capital provider for 
enterprises and private sectors, with over 75 percent in Vietnam. Other channels play 
a modest role in supplying capital. For example, while market capitalization of listed 
TABLE 1. Capital supply situation in Vietnam
Financial institutions
e share of total 
!nancial assets 
e management agency
Banks and non-banks (total assets)
r 7 state commercial banks
r 2 Vietnam banks for policies
r 28 joint-stock commercial banks
r 7 banks with 100% foreign capital and 2 joint-
venture banks
r 50 foreign bank branches and 50 representative 
o%ces
r 1100 credit funds
r 16 "nancial companies and 11 "nancial leasing 
companies
75.2% !e state bank of Vietnam 
Bonds (Government, company and bank) 9.3% !e state bank of Vietnam 
Insurance and reinsurance company 1.8% Ministry of Finance
Stock (the market capitalization of listed stocks)
r 88 stock companies, 46 fund management 
companies and 25 investment funds
r 8 custody banks
r 686 companies listed on the stock market
13.7%
State security commission 
of Vietnam and Ministry of 
Finance
Source: State bank, State security commission, Ministry of Finance and ADB
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stocks provides 13.7 percent of total "nancial market, bonds and insurance companies 
only account for 1.8 percent and 9.3 percent, respectively.
Also, a<er nearly 30 years of renovation (Doi Moi), the Vietnamese economy has 
gained many achievements, transforming into one of the most dynamic markets in 
South East Asia. Besides the rapid growth and development, according to Nguyen and 
Van Dijk (2012), corruption in Viet Nam is more widespread than before. In spite of 
the anti-corruption activities implemented by the local government, the Vietnamese 
ranking was very low at 112 out of 168 countries in terms of corruption level in 2015 
according to Transparency International (TI). 
In addition, for Vietnam, big gaps between formal institutions  laws and the enforce-
ment capacity of the local authorities have been documented. Furthermore, the insti-
tutional quality across provinces developed unevenly – several provinces lag behind, 
others witness a signi"cant improvement in economic governance and business invest-
ment (Malesky, 2007). !is situation motivates us to consider whether corruption has 
an e#ect on the capital structure of "rms, and if so, how. 
3. Data Sources and methodology
3.1 Data source
!is study uses two data sources. First, data are extracted from the surveys by the Dan-
ish International Development Agency with the assistance of the Institute of Labour 
Science and Social A#airs, the Central Institute for Economic Management and the 
University of Copenhagen. !e results of these surveys are based on questionnaires 
every two years from 2005 to 2011, and this study employs the data in years 2005, 2007, 
2009 and 2011. !ese sources provide the information about over ten thousand private 
manufacturing enterprises in ten provinces in the Southern, Central and Northern re-
gions of Vietnam. !rough the surveys, many useful indicators such as the "rm size, age 
and export, the "gures about capital structure, i.e. the proportion of total debt to total 
asset, the short-term capital structure, the long- term capital structure and, especially, 
forms of bribery are recorded. As a result, the availability of data allows this study to 
consider the impact of corruption on "rm capital structure. 
Another data set is taken from the surveys of the Vietnam aggregated Provincial 
Competitiveness Index (PCI), which were implemented by the Vietnam Competitive-
ness Initiative in collaboration with the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
in the period 2005-2011 to assess the institutional quality of provinces or local govern-
ments. !e survey o#ers nine institutional sub-indices across the years of the period. 
!ese indices include: First, entry costs including (i) time for a "rm registration and land 
acquisition, (ii) time required for "rms to complete all the necessary licenses needed to 
begin a business as well as the level of di%culty to have such licenses/permits. Second, 
access to the acquired land and the security of business premises a<er land acquisition. 
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&ird, transparency and access to information, that is whether enterprises have access to 
appropriate planning and legal documents for doing their business, training and labour, 
as well as whether new laws are provided to enterprises su%ciently and predictably im-
plemented. Fourth, cost of time to handle regulatory compliance measure, e.g. bureau-
cratic compliance or decisions to implement local regulations. Fi%h, informal payments 
measuring an enterprise’s perception about the corruption from local o%cials. Sixth, 
distortion o#ering privileges to state owned enterprises, e.g. incentives, policy, and al-
location of capital and credit sources toward state-owned enterprises. Seventh, services 
for private sector development, provinces private sector business growth promotion 
programs and the development of industrial zones and parks. Eighth, employment and 
worker training ‒ whether/how provincial authorities promote vocational training and 
skills development for local "rms. Ninth, legal institutions measuring the trust from 
"rms on provincial courts and contract enforcement. 
Combining two data sets together, I created a unique province ‒ "rm level panel 
dataset with 2684, 2483, 2515, 2449 observations in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011, re-
spectively. More speci"cally for the dataset, Table 2 provides the de"nitions and statis-
tical description of main variables in the model.
TABLE 2. Summary Statistics for the main variables
Variables1
20052 2007 2009 2011
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Capital structure (total debt/total asset) 0.12 0.39 0.11 0.23 0.10 0.23 0.07 0.19
Short-term capital structure (short-term 
debt/ total debt)
0.38 0.47 0.357 0.465 0.438 0.479 0.392 0.478
Long-term capital structure (long-term 
debt/ total debt)
0.20 0.38 0.187 0.373 0.1509 0.334 0.111 0.298
Firm-level variable
Bribe (Dummy) (Whether or not "rms 
pay informal costs)
0.405 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.34 0.47 0.38 0.48
Firm size(log) (Total number of labour-
ers of "rms)
2.04 1.12 2.05 1.12 2.05 1.14 1.93 1.13
Firm age (!e number of years since the 
"rm’s  establishment)
5.13 1.82 5.40 1.85 5.45 1.86 5.81 1.79
Export (Whether or not "rms have 
exporting activities)
0.058 0.23 0.052 0.22 0.057 0.23 0.059 0.23
Institutional quality at province level
Entry cost 7.19 1.13 7.62 0.71 8.22 0.35 8.62 0.29
Land access 5.33 1.13 5.75 0.80 5.55 0.68 5.7 0.87
1 1USD equated to about 16,000; 17,000; 19,000 and 20,000 VND in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, respectively.
2  Provincial level indices of 2006 instead of 2005 are used because of two reasons. First, our focus is on 10 
provinces, but PCI in 2005 did not survey some of these provinces. In addition, "rm-level survey in 2005 was 
conducted from late October onwards. !us using CPI of 2006 does match quite well with "rm-level data of 
2005.
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Variables
2005 2007 2009 2011
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Transparency 5.83 1.17 6.07 0.79 5.9 0.33 5.96 0.43
Time cost 4.81 0.93 6.57 0.83 6.11 0.52 6.11 0.68
Informal charge 5.84 0.97 6.15 0.60 5.33 0.54 6.31 0.90
Proactive 4.79 1.51 4.96 1.24 3.76 0.83 4.19 0.98
Private act 5.69 1.62 5.87 1.93 6.29 1.21 5.68 1.37
Worker training 5.68 1.65 5.27 1.01 4.87 0.84 5.20 0.47
Legal framework 3.82 1.16 3.99 0.71 5.21 0.53 5.78 0.34
PCI 53.84 7.18 56.76 5.61 56.59 3.66 59.45 3.24
Observations 2684 2483 2515 2449
3.2 Methodology 
Using a dynamic panel modelling approach to solve the dynamic nature of economic 
processes is becoming increasingly important in recent years (Flannery & Hankins, 
2013). !is dynamic process means that the current "rm performance and other "rm-
speci"c characteristics are driven by past performance. To address the “dynamic endo-
geneity”, empirical analyses using "rm performance as a dependent variable must be 
investigated in a dynamic framework in which lagged dependent variable(s) are used as 
explanatory variable(s) (Wintoki et al., 2012).
Wooldridge (2009) noted that including lagged dependent variable(s) as explana-
tory variables in empirical models allows empiricists to account for unobserved histori-
cal factors which have potential impacts on current "rm performance, thus mitigating 
omi$ed variable bias. In addition, corruption is also a dynamic process, and hence the 
lag of corruption is also entered as an independent variable in the model. Furthermore, 
corruption can be di#erent at sizes, age and industries. Consequently, a series of in-
teractions between corruption with size, age and industries are controlled for and the 
model is speci"ed as below:
 (1)
Where 
Where: Yit is the outcome variable (as measured by a "rm’s capital structure) of "rm 
i in year t; as is the estimated coe%cient on lagged dependent variables; Corruption is 
commonly understood as the abuse of power by public o%cials for private gains (Sven-
sson, 2005). According to Rand and Tarp (2012), bribe is measured as a dummy vari-
able based on the question whether "rms paid informal or communication fees in this 
study. !e bribe payment or communications fees are mainly used for several purposes. 
For example, they are used to get connected with public services, to get licenses and 
permits, to gain government contract, to deal with procedures with banks.
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Z is a set of "rm-related explanatory variables ("rm size, "rm age, and export) includ-
ed in the model as guided by previous studies (e.g., Alves & Ferreira, 2011; Fungáčová 
et al., 2015). I also account for potential e#ects arising from di#erences across indus-
tries by including dummy variables for industry classi"cation in the models. μi repre-
sents time-invariant unobserved "rm characteristics; time-speci"c e#ects are denoted 
by ωt , and εit represents the classical error term.
Previous studies on "rm performance (Vu, Tran, Nguyen, & Lim, 2016; Wintoki et 
al. (2012) suggest that the past information be captured adequately by two lags of the 
dependent variable. To examine this issue, I used a model speci"cation in which the 
current capital structure is a dependent variable being regressed on two lags of past "rm 
performance, and other covariates as in equation (1). Using this formulation, an insig-
ni"cant impact of Yit-2 on current "rm "nancial performance was con"rmed. !erefore, 
this suggests that using one-year lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable 
in a "rst-order autoregressive [AR(1)] structure is enough to address the potential dy-
namic endogeneity. !e results are similar for other lagged values of other independent 
variables. !is is in accordance with a study by Zhou, Fa#, and Alpert (2014), which 
argues that an AR(1) structure appears to be unavoidable when almost all panel data-
sets used in corporate "nance research are short. !e AR(1) panel model speci"cation 
is given in detail as follows:
Prior studies also indicate that not controlling for institutional quality factors may 
bias the e#ect of corruption on "rm capital structure. For example, De Jong, Kabir, and 
Nguyen (2008) noted that it is not only "rms’ a$ributes that have a direct impact on 
their capital structure but also factors such as the institutional quality of a country or 
a company’s business practices and so forth that will produce in=uences on the choice 
of capital structure.  Corruption can “grease or sand the wheel” if the institutional envi-
ronment is good or bad (Méon & Weill, 2010). !us, indexes of institutional quality at 
provincial level (Pm,jt) are controlled for in the model.  Also, lagged values of indices of 
institutional quality are entered in the model to account for unobserved historical fac-
tors which have potential impacts on current "rm capital structure:
With respect to estimation approach, given the presence of the AR(1) structure in 
equation (2), the pooled OLS (OLS) and the OLS with "xed-e#ects (FE) methods 
are likely to provide inconsistent estimates (Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Wintoki, et al., 
2012). !us, studies o<en use traditional IV approach to obtain consistent estimates. 
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Unfortunately, it tends to be infeasible to "nd a set of external instrumental variables 
when almost all independent variables are o<en considered not exogenous. To rectify 
this issue, the current study uses the two-step system generalised method of moments 
estimator (System GMM) developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). !is estimator is 
superior to the OLS or FE as it controls for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
across "rms, simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Wintoki 
et al., 2012).
4. Empirical results and discussions
!is section provides the results of the empirical analyses for the role of corruption on 
"rm capital structure by using the dynamic two-step GMM approaches.
TABLE 3. e impact of corruption on capital structure3
VARIABLES
Capital structure Short-term capital structure Long-term capital structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lagleverage 0.0774+ 0.0364 0.0407
(0.040) (0.029) (0.031)
laglev_st 0.0363 0.0373 0.0384
(0.026) (0.023) (0.024)
laglev_lt 0.0459 0.0416 0.0311
(0.029) (0.030) (0.025)
Corruption -0.0014 -0.0497 -0.0847 0.0702* 0.1377* 0.1626+ -0.0459* -0.1138+ -0.1858**
(0.008) (0.040) (0.067) (0.034) (0.069) (0.098) (0.022) (0.060) (0.064)
Lag of corrup-
tion
-0.0120+ -0.0147 -0.0144 -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0027 -0.0221 -0.0167 0.0158
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016)
Lnsize 0.0290** 0.0154 0.0157 0.0702** 0.0842** 0.0862** 0.0217 0.0107 0.0169
(0.005) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027) (0.028) (0.014) (0.023) (0.018)
Corruption*
size
0.0014 0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0023 0.0013 0.0006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lnage
-0.0218** -0.0185* -0.0226* -0.0139 -0.0106 -0.0098 -0.0217+ -0.0301* -0.0317**
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010)
Corruption*
Age
0.0012 0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0018 0.0034* 0.0026
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Corruption*
High-tech 
industries
-0.0272 -0.0051 0.2147
(0.156) (0.260) (0.194)
Corruption* 
medium-tech 
industries
0.0921 -0.0680 0.3094**
(0.117) (0.167) (0.105)
Export 
0.0378 0.0363 0.0310 -0.1023 -0.0400 -0.0418 0.0580 0.0440 0.0688+
(0.024) (0.036) (0.037) (0.070) (0.054) (0.055) (0.048) (0.049) (0.040)
Entry cost
-0.0135 -0.0201 -0.0185 -0.0713* -0.0788** -0.0774* -0.0247 -0.0342 -0.0444+
(0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025)
Land access
-0.0050 0.0020 0.0007 -0.0162 -0.0379+ -0.0382+ 0.0280 0.0297 0.0120
(0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.015)
Transparency 
-0.0054 0.0114 0.0068 -0.2051** -0.2042** -0.2019** -0.0164 -0.0144 -0.0335
(0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.057) (0.046) (0.047) (0.043) (0.043) (0.038)
3 I also conducted several sensitivity analyses. For example, I replaced provincial level sub-indices of institutional 
quality with the aggregated index (PCI); or export was excluded. However, qualitatively similar results have 
been obtained in all cases, and they are available on request.
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VARIABLES
Capital structure Short-term capital structure Long-term capital structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Time cost
-0.0152* -0.0024 -0.0041 -0.1005** -0.1032** -0.1022** 0.0052 0.0064 0.0156
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
Informal charge
-0.0034 -0.0107 -0.0075 -0.0160 -0.0045 -0.0056 -0.0050 -0.0021 -0.0059
(0.007) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017)
Proactive
0.0186** 0.0092 0.0107+ 0.1046** 0.1088** 0.1073** -0.0209+ -0.0213+ -0.0060
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Private act
-0.0124** -0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0086 -0.0152 -0.0158 0.0014 0.0051 -0.0124
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008)
Labour training
0.0065 -0.0150 -0.0140 -0.0055 0.0093 0.0106 0.0038 -0.0008 0.0200
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.033) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019)
Legal frame-
work
-0.0199* 0.0026 -0.0006 -0.0461 -0.0596* -0.0591* 0.0004 0.0067 -0.0040
(0.010) (0.016) (0.017) (0.038) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025)
Lag of entry 
cost
0.0134+ 0.0042 0.0026 -0.0285 -0.0302 -0.0315 -0.0170 -0.0132 0.0140
(0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.038) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.030) (0.021)
Lag of land 
access
-0.0029 0.0061 0.0037 -0.0368 -0.0382+ -0.0361+ -0.0403* -0.0379* -0.0339*
(0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.025) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015)
Lag of transpar-
ency
-0.0147+ -0.0086 -0.0126 -0.1203** -0.1123** -0.1107** -0.0244 -0.0273 -0.0314+
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Lag of time cost
-0.0131 -0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0709+ -0.1052** -0.1047** -0.0360 -0.0321 -0.0357
(0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024)
Lag of informal
charge
-0.0003 -0.0217 -0.0153 -0.0250 0.0241 0.0219 0.0767* 0.0689* 0.0589*
(0.012) (0.019) (0.020) (0.046) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.027)
Lag of proactive
-0.0010 0.0024 0.0042 0.0750** 0.0655** 0.0648** -0.0113 -0.0108 -0.0137
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Lag of private 
act
-0.0011 -0.0048 -0.0046 -0.0844** -0.0737** -0.0729** 0.0083 0.0091 0.0028
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Lag of labour
Training
0.0047 0.0043 0.0048 0.1124** 0.1004** 0.1000** 0.0017 0.0036 0.0118
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
Lag of legal
framework
0.0027 -0.0066 -0.0079 -0.0344 -0.0370 -0.0365 0.0208 0.0196 0.0269
(0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.029) (0.024) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)
Constant
0.4693* 0.4097 0.5003 4.4252** 4.4657** 4.4323** 0.5604 0.5734 0.5983
(0.186) (0.310) (0.321) (0.682) (0.547) (0.553) (0.483) (0.483) (0.424)
Observations 6,087 6,087 6,087 6,121 6,121 6,121 6,121 6,121 6,121
Number of 
instruments
24 26 28 24 26 28 24 26 28
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test 
for endogeneity 
of repressors 
(p-value)
0.0005 0.003 0.0005 0.0000 0.0004 0.0002 0.004 0.006 0.0004
Hansen tests of 
exogeneity of 
instrument sets
0.434 0.629 0.647 0.431 0.451 0.385 0.751 0.661 0.737
Notes: Models are estimated by two-step GMM and include industry dummies, year dummies and !rm !xed-e$ects; 
Asterisks indicate signi!cance at 10% (+), 5% (*), and 1% (**). Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Following Schultz et al., (2010) and Wintoki et al., (2014), !rm age and year dummies are considered to be exogenous.
First, regarding the main variable of interest, columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 3 show that 
corruption impacts insigni"cantly on the "rm capital structure. !e "nding supports 
the perspectives of institutional theory, and this may be explained by the fact that cor-
ruption is very popular in Vietnam and hence it is considered as an entry payment for 
every "rm which must pay to participate in the market or compete with neighbors for 
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survival. When a "rm pays a bribe, neighbor "rms also pay bribe, thus, there are no sta-
tistically signi"cant di#erences in the e#ect of corruption on "rms and their neighbors. 
!is "nding is partly consistent with Vu et al. (2016), who also indicate that there is an 
insigni"cant relation between corruption and "rm performance. 
Looking more closely, I explore the e#ects of corruption on di#erent types of "rms’ 
capital structure. Interestingly, the e#ect of corruption is di#erent for various types of 
capital structure. !e results from columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 3 show that paying bri-
be helps "rms gain more external credit. !is stems from the fact that although the 
rapid development of Vietnam’s capital market has o#ered more options for corporate 
funding, capital market remains relatively underdeveloped and banks remain the ma-
jor capital provider for corporations and occupy a monopolistic position in the credit 
market ( see Table 1). Although the state Bank decreases the banks’ monopoly pro"t by 
controlling interest rates, bank o%cers have various methods of evading those controls 
and taking rent from corporations by virtue of their monopolistic position, obtaining 
illegal pro"ts in the process. To increase the likelihood of receiving credit, corpora-
tions and "rms are willing to bribe such bank o%cers. In the meantime, regulators are 
strict about banks’ control of their non-performing loan rate, which means that banks 
must control the risk of not regaining their capital. !us, banks would prefer to grant 
more short-term credit, especially in regions in which corruption is very serious. As a 
result, corruption impacts positively on short-term debt of "rms.  !e "ndings support 
some perspectives from previous studies (e.g., Diamond, 1991; Jiang & Li, 2005). Such 
studies also reveal that short-term credits are favorable for banks to obtain timely and 
constant information about debtors, thus placing corporations under the banks’ close 
supervision and control in regions with high corruption level. 
While bribery helps to boost short-term bank debts, it hinders long-term bank 
debts. As shown by columns 7, 8 and 9 of Table 3, "rms paying bribe have lower access 
to long-term bank credit than those without paying bribe. !is can be interpreted in the 
way that banks are more hesitant to o#er long-term loans if they are in a very corrupt en-
vironment.  Long-term bank loans are less prevalent and more strictly controlled inside 
banks compared with short-term bank loans. !e choice to grant such loans may de-
pend more on the legal framework through the protection of creditors and the enforce-
ment of loan contracts. Banks may not receive the capital back or they may have to add 
extra expenses to ensure their business safety in countries with a poor law-enforcement 
system. !us, corruption has a negative in=uence on "rms’ ability to obtain long-term 
bank credit in this context.
In terms of "rm-level characteristics, as expected, "rm size has a positive impact on 
"rm capital structure performance. For example, column 2 of Table 3 shows 1 percent 
increase in sizes of "rm coupled with 0.03 percent increase in accessing external "nance, 
with other things constant. !e results are consistent with most "ndings in the litera-
ture. !is "nding provides the same perspectives with trade–o# theory which reported 
the positive relationship between company size and level of debt "nancing. Accord-
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ing to Deesomsak, Paudyal, and Pesce$o (2004), large companies have small volatility 
of cash =ow and more transparency in "nancial activities that help them access credit 
more easily. In addition, export activities have an insigni"cant impact on "rm capital 
structure, while "rm age as measured by the number of years in business witnesses a 
negative association with "rms’ capital structure. 
!e estimated results in the columns of Table 3 reveal that the role of provincial 
quality of institution on "rm capital structure is di#erent depending on the model 
speci"cation. For example, time cost has a negative and signi"cant impact on "rm capi-
tal structure. In addition, while actions supporting private sectors (Private act) do not 
help "rms to access external "nance because of complicated administrative procedure, 
transparency in "nance and information helps "rms access bank’s credit. Surprisingly, 
labour training has no impact on "rm capital structure, and this may be explained by 
the outdated education in Vietnam where theory is heavily focused on, while practical 
skills are hardly dealt with, quality of instructors is at worrying low levels, and teaching 
equipment is not updated.
5. Conclusion
!e paper aims to estimate the e#ect of corruption on Vietnamese SMEs’ capital struc-
ture from 2005 to 2011. Unlike previous studies, this study considers for the "rst time 
the impact of corruption at both "rm and provincial levels on "rms’ capital structure in 
Vietnam. Some main interesting "ndings are presented below.
Some provincial institutional factors such as time costs for private sector are nega-
tively associated with "rms’ capital structure; while transparency in "nance and infor-
mation improves the "rms’ access to bank’s credit. !is implies that simpli"cation of 
procedure to save time for enterprises, and increasing actions to make information and 
procedures clear are necessary to improve access to external "nancial sources.
!e "nding of a negative linkage between corruption and the improvement in "rms’ 
long-term  "nancial access implies that measures against corruption are necessary for 
the development of SMEs. Anti-corruption campaign has been implemented for many 
years, but its results are limited.  !is suggests that political e#orts and willingness from 
central government, particularly from the Communist Party, is crucial for the success 
of anti-corruption. A transparent legal framework and e#ective enforcement should be 
encouraged and e#ectively implemented to control corruption in Vietnam. 
!ere is some limitation in the current study. !e study used data from manufactur-
ing SMEs, so its "ndings might not represent whole enterprise. Especially, the "nd-
ings might not be true for large enterprises which own di#erent resources and busi-
ness behaviours including markets and negotiating powers. !is suggests that further 
research on larger "rms and other sectors beyond manufacturing should be done to 
make a general conclusion about the relationship between corruption and "rms’ capital 
structure in Vietnam. Finally, future research should be conducted in other transitional 
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economies using the same methodology as in the current study to examine whether a 
negative association between corruption and "rm capital structure is found to be con-
sistent beyond Vietnam.
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